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Abstract
International trade costs are of vital importance because they determine trade
patterns and therefore economic performance. This paper develops a new
micro-founded measure of international trade costs. It is based on a multi-
country general equilibrium model of trade that incorporates bilateral ice-
berg trade costs. The model results in a gravity equation from which the
implied trade costs can be easily computed. The trade cost measure is intu-
itive, takes multilateral resistance into account and yields empirical results that
are economically sensible. It is found that during the post-World War II period
trade costs have declined markedly. The dispersion of trade costs across coun-
tries can best be explained by geographical and historical factors like distance
and colonial linkages but also by tari¤s and free trade agreements.
JEL classication: F1, F4
Keywords: Trade Costs, Gravity, Distance, Economic Integration
I am grateful to Petra Geraats, Chris Meissner, Francesco Caselli, Jakob de Haan, Keith Head and
Stephen Redding for valuable comments. I would also like to thank conference/seminar participants at
the 2005 Annual Congress of the European Economic Association (EEA) in Amsterdam, the Faculty of
Economics at the University of Groningen as well as the Department of Land Economy and the Faculty
of Economics at the University of Cambridge. Any remaining errors are mine.
yDepartment of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom.
d.novy@warwick.ac.uk and http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/sta¤/faculty/novy/
1 Introduction
Barriers to international trade are large and since they impede trade ows, they have a
strong impact on countries overall economic performance and welfare. Some barriers,
like tari¤s and transportation costs, are directly observable but numerous other barriers
are notoriously di¢ cult to measure, for example administrative and communication costs.
The aim of this paper is to derive a comprehensive measure of trade costs that can capture
all barriers to international trade.
This comprehensive measure of trade barriers is derived by incorporating bilateral
iceberg trade costs into a multi-country general equilibrium model of trade. Iceberg
trade costs mean that for each good that is exported a certain fraction melts away during
the trading process as if an iceberg were shipped across the ocean. The model yields a
simple micro-founded gravity equation from which the implied international trade costs
can be inferred. This indirect approach results in a comprehensive measure of trade
barriers that is both intuitive and easy to compute.
Empirical bilateral trade costs are thus obtained for a sample of 29 mostly OECD
countries during the post-World War II period. For the G7 subsample trade costs fell by
26:5 percent between 1960 and 2002. Similarly, for European Union countries trade costs
declined by 17:7 percent between 1977 and 2002. For both subsamples the 2002 tari¤
equivalent of trade costs is about 40 percent. More specically, trade costs have fallen
most dramatically for nearby trading partners, implying an increase in regional economic
integration that is consistent with the emergence of regional free trade agreements such
as NAFTA and the European Common Market.
Apart from providing snapshots of trade costs over time, the paper also seeks to explain
the dispersion of trade costs across country pairs. The most important determinants of
trade costs are found to be geographical factors like distance and being landlocked as well
as historical linkages such as a common colonial history and the use of a common language.
In particular, sharing a common colonial history on average cuts the tari¤ equivalent of
trade costs by 16 percentage points and using a common language reduces trade barriers
by 10 percentage points. Both these e¤ects have diminished over time, however, as the
impact of colonial history has subsided and as the learning of foreign languages has become
more widespread. Perhaps more surprisingly, institutional factors like tari¤s and nominal
exchange rate volatility play a smaller role in explaining the dispersion of trade costs.
Trade costs have recently attracted wide attention in the literature. James Anderson
and Eric van Wincoop (2004) present an in-depth survey of trade costs and argue that the
representative tari¤ equivalent of international trade costs is around 74 percent, which is
consistent with the range found in the present paper. David Hummels (2001) measures
some components of trade costs directly such as transportation costs. His measures, how-
ever, are usually specic to particular goods or transportation modes and therefore not
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necessarily representative of overall trade costs in an economy.
The traditional way of accounting for trade costs is by ex ante assuming trade costs to
consist of certain components and then including these components into a gravity equa-
tion. Two well-known applications of this strand are John McCallums (1995) and Andrew
Roses (2000) papers. McCallum (1995) examines the e¤ect of the U.S.-Canadian border
as a very general form of a trade costs, whereas Rose (2000) focuses on common curren-
cies. However, as pointed out by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), such atheoretical
inclusion of trade cost components can lead to an omitted variable bias and therefore
invalid comparative statics. In contrast, this paper follows a di¤erent approach by mea-
suring trade costs indirectly and comprehensively through inference from aggregate trade
ows on the basis of a theoretically derived gravity equation. In this two-step procedure
a micro-founded measure of bilateral trade costs is computed rst and then the trade cost
components are identied ex post.
Scott Baier and Je¤rey Bergstrand (2001) also derive a gravity equation that includes
trade costs but they restrict trade costs to transportation costs and tari¤s and do not
consider other geographical, historical or institutional determinants. More recently, An-
derson and van Wincoop (2003) introduce a micro-founded gravity equation with trade
costs based on a general equilibrium framework that is conditional on a certain allocation
of production and consumption. The drawback of this framework is that it does not allow
for valid comparative statics. For example, a change in trade barriers will not only have
an e¤ect on trade ows but also on the allocation of production and consumption within
countries. To account for such e¤ects I develop a general equilibrium framework in which
the allocation of production and consumption is determined endogenously.
In addition, the gravity equations developed by Baier and Bergstrand (2001) and
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) include price indices that are unobservable because
they are theoretical constructs. But the gravity equation I derive in the present paper is
more practical since it consists of observable variables only and therefore provides an easy
and intuitive way of computing trade costs.
The results on the factors that drive the dispersion of trade costs are generally con-
sistent with previous ndings in the literature, which is surveyed by Anderson and van
Wincoop (2004). For example, the language barrier estimates by Hummels (2001) and
Jonathan Eaton and Samuel Kortum (2002) lie in the same range as mine. Similar to my
results, Je¤rey Frankel and Andrew Rose (2002) nd evidence that a common colonial
history signicantly facilitates trade. Furthermore, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)
point out that nowadays most developed countries have low tari¤s and that tari¤s there-
fore only represent a small fraction of overall trade costs. This observation is reected in
my nding that tari¤s only play a minor role in explaining the dispersion of trade costs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the general equilibrium model
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with iceberg trade costs, resulting in the essential gravity equation. Section 3 presents the
historical evolution of trade costs with special emphasis on the G7 and European Union
countries, showing that economic integration has progressed fastest on a regional level.
Section 4 identies the factors that determine trade costs and provides a discussion of the
results, also comparing them to evidence from the late 19th century trade boom. Section
5 concludes.
2 A Model with Iceberg Trade Costs
This section develops a micro-founded general equilibrium model that is similar to the
framework typically encountered in the New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature,
as for example in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995), with the exception that the model abstracts
from price stickiness as it does not focus on the short run. The model augments the
standard framework in three distinct ways. First, it extends it to multiple countries. Sec-
ond, it adds nontradable goods and third, as its central ingredient the model incorporates
iceberg trade costs of the kind introduced by Samuelson (1954) and rst included in a
monopolistic competition model by Krugman (1980).
Optimizing consumers and rms inhabit J countries with j = 1; 2;:::; J and J  2.
The range of all consumers and of all goods produced in the world is the continuum [0; 1].
Country j comprises the consumer range [nj 1; nj ] and country-j monopolistic rms each
produce one di¤erentiated good on the same range, where n0 = 0 and nJ = 1. It is assumed
that the exogenous fraction sj of goods is tradable so that [nj 1; nj 1 + sj(nj   nj 1)]
is the range of all tradable goods produced by country j (0 < sj  1).1 These can be
purchased by all consumers in the world. The remaining range [nj 1 + sj(nj   nj 1); nj ]
represents country js nontradable goods. The latter are available for purchase to country-
j consumers only.
Exogenous bilateral iceberg trade costs  j;k are incurred when goods are shipped
from country j to country k where
 j;k
(
 0 for j 6= k
= 0 for j = k
Iceberg trade costs mean that for each unit of goods that is shipped from j to k the fraction
 j;k melts away as if an iceberg were shipped across the ocean ( j;k < 1 for j 6= k). Note
that bilateral trade costs can be asymmetric such that  j;k 6= k;j . The assumption of
zero intranational trade costs is a normalization which can also be found in Baier and
Bergstrand (2001).
1For an empirical motivation of this assumption see Section 2.4.
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2.1 Consumers
All consumers within one country are identical. They like consumption and dislike work
such that their utility can be described as
Uj = lnCj +  ln (1  Lj) (1)
where Cj and Lj denote per-capita consumption and labor input in country j. The para-
meter  is assumed to be identical across countries. Cj is a CES composite consumption
index dened as
Cj 
"
JX
k=1
Z nk 1+sk(nk nk 1)
nk 1
(cji)
 1
 d i+
Z nj
nj 1+sj(nj nj 1)
(cji)
 1
 d i
# 
 1
(2)
where cji denotes the per-capita consumption of good i in country j. The country-j
consumption index (2) is dened over all tradable goods produced in the world, which is
the left term within the brackets of (2), plus all nontradable goods produced by country
j, which are given by the right term within the brackets. The parameter  > 1 is the
elasticity of substitution and it is assumed to be identical across countries.
The consumption-based price index is dened as the minimum expenditure for one
unit of Cj and can be derived from (2) as
Pj =
"
JX
k=1
Z nk 1+sk(nk nk 1)
nk 1
(ji)
1 
d i+
Z nj
nj 1+sj(nj nj 1)
(ji)
1 
d i
# 1
1 
(3)
where ji denotes the prices of the individual goods as follows
ji =
(
1
1 k;j p
T
ki for nk 1  i  nk 1 + sk(nk   nk 1) 8 j; k
pNTji for nj 1 + sj(nj   nj 1)  i  nj
(4)
pTki denotes the f.o.b. (free on board) price of the tradable good produced by country-k
rm i and pTki=(1  k;j) is the c.i.f. (cost, insurance, freight) price of the same good when
traded with country j. pNTji is the price of the nontradable good produced by country-j
rm i. All prices are denominated in one world currency.
The c.i.f. price is 1=(1 k;j) times the f.o.b. price because when one unit of a tradable
good produced by a country-k rm is shipped to country j, only the fraction (1   k;j)
arrives at the destination. The tari¤ equivalent k;j of iceberg trade costs can be expressed
as
k;j =
1
1  k;j   1 =
k;j
1  k;j (5)
Maximizing consumption (2) subject to the minimum expenditure (3) yields the indi-
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vidual demand function
cji =

ji
Pj
 
Cj (6)
Finally, the per-capita budget constraint in country j is given by
PjCj =WjLj + j (7)
whereWj is the nominal wage and j denotes per-capita nominal prots made by country-j
rms, which are fully redistributed to country-j consumers.
2.2 Firms
There is monopolistic competition such that each rm is the single producer of one di¤er-
entiated good and sets the prot-maximizing price. Not all rms within one country are
symmetric since in country j the fraction sj of rms produces tradable goods, whereas
the fraction (1  sj) produces nontradable goods. Let yTji denote the output produced by
country-j tradable rm i and yNTji the output produced by country-j nontradable rm i.
In addition, let yTji;k be the tradable output of rm i produced for country k so that
yTji 
JX
k=1
yTji;k (8)
All rms face a linear production function that has constant returns to scale and that
operates with labor as the only input
yTji;k = AjL
T
ji;k (9)
yNTji = AjL
NT
ji (10)
where Aj is an exogenous and country-specic technology level that is assumed to be the
same across the tradable and nontradable sectors. LTji;k and L
NT
ji denote the amount of
labor used to produce yTji;k and y
NT
ji with
LTji 
JX
k=1
LTji;k (11)
Note that since all consumers within one country are identical, they each spread their labor
over all domestic rms according to how much labor input each rm needs. Since labor
is assumed to be internationally immobile, domestic consumers do not work for foreign
rms.
With clearing markets it follows from demand function (6) for the tradable good pro-
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duced by country-j rm i
(1   j;k) yTji;k =
 1
1 j;k p
T
ji
Pk
! 
(nk   nk 1)Ck (12)
The right-hand side of (12) represents the amount of the tradable good i that the (nk  
nk 1) consumers in country k demand. The left-hand side is the amount of the same good
that arrives in country k after being shipped there from country j. Accordingly, it follows
for a country-j nontradable good
yNTji =
 
pNTji
Pj
! 
(nj   nj 1)Cj (13)
The prot function for tradable rm i in country j is
Tji =
JX
k=1
 
pTjiy
T
ji;k  WjLTji;k

(14)
whereWj is the nominal wage that is assumed to be same in the tradable and nontradable
sectors. Plugging the production function (9) and the market-clearing condition (12) into
(14) and maximizing with respect to pTji yields
pTji =

  1
Wj
Aj
(15)
For nontradable rms the same procedure leads to
pNTji =

  1
Wj
Aj
(16)
so that
pTji = p
NT
ji  pj (17)
Thus, all country-j rms set the same price pj , irrespective of whether they produce
tradable or nontradable goods.
2.3 A Gravity Equation with Trade Costs
Appendix A.1 shows that the model outlined above has a unique equilibrium solution. As
one might expect, in equilibrium trade costs reduce the real wage, consumption and real
prots.2
Since all country-j rms producing tradable goods are symmetric and since sj(nj  
2See equations (31)-(33) and (37) in Appendix A.1.
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nj 1) is the overall number of these rms, all goods that leave country j for destination
country k are given by
EXPj;k = sj(nj   nj 1)yTji;k (18)
where EXPj;k denotes real exports from j to k. Appendix A.2 shows that by using
market-clearing condition (12) and plugging in the equilibrium solutions for prices and
consumption, one can derive a micro-founded gravity equation that incorporates trade
costs
EXPj;kEXPk;j = sj (GDPj   EXPj) sk (GDPk   EXPk) (1   j;k) 1 (1  k;j) 1
(19)
where GDPj is real output of country j and EXPj 
P
k 6=j
EXPj;k are total real exports
from j.
Of course, bilateral trade EXPj;kEXPk;j in (19) decreases if bilateral trade costs  j;k
and k;j are higher. It also decreases if there are fewer rms that produce tradable goods,
i.e. if the shares sj and sk are lower. Given these variables, bilateral trade is not solely
determined by GDP as in traditional gravity equations, but by the terms (GDPj   EXPj)
and (GDPk   EXPk). These terms can be interpreted as market potentialterms in the
sense that (GDPj   EXPj) is country-j output which is potentially tradable but not yet
traded. For example, if GDPj increases with total exports EXPj and everything else
constant, then the market potential and thus bilateral trade will increase. Vice versa,
if total exports EXPj increase with GDPj and everything else constant, then market
potential and thus bilateral trade will drop. The reason is the general equilibrium e¤ect
that in order for an increase in EXPj to occur, trade costs with third countries must have
dropped, for instance  j;l with l 6= k, making trade between j and k relatively more costly.
Market potential takes trade into account that is conducted with third countries and that
will not be diverted to country k for given trade costs.
Gravity equation (19) therefore captures what Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) call
multilateral resistance, i.e. the idea that trade ows are determined by two countries
bilateral trade barriers (i.e.  j;k and k;j) relative to their average trade barriers. For
example, imagine that all trade barriers  j;l between j and all countries l with l 6= k go
down with everything else constant including  j;k. Then total exports EXPj increase
and trade between j and k drops. The total export terms EXPj and EXPk in (19) can
therefore be referred to as multilateral resistance variables because they implicitly capture
average trade barriers.
Alternatively, one can think of multilateral resistance in terms of trade destruction
and trade diversion. For example, if bilateral trade barriers go up everywhere in the world
except between countries j and k (i.e.  j;k and k;j are constant), then total trade ows in
the world are diminished, i.e. there is trade destruction. But j and k will redirect some of
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the destroyedtrade towards each other because the relative trade barriers between these
two countries have dropped, i.e. there is trade diversion.
Baier and Bergstrand (2001) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) derive gravity
equations which capture multilateral resistance by price indices that are di¢ cult to ob-
serve because they are theoretical constructs. Gravity equation (19), however, captures
multilateral resistance by directly observable variables and is therefore more practical.
Another advantage of gravity equation (19) is that it allows for an easy computation
of the bilateral trade costs that are implied by observable trade ows. In order to identify
trade costs, it is assumed that bilateral trade costs are symmetric ( j;k = k;j), an as-
sumption which is standard in the literature, for instance in Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003). It is also assumed that the fraction of rms producing tradable goods is the same
across countries (sj = sk = s).3 Gravity equation (19) can then be rewritten as
 j;k = k;j = 1 

EXPj;kEXPk;j
(GDPj   EXPj) (GDPk   EXPk) s2
 1
2 2
(20)
Intuitively, if bilateral trade ows between j and k rise all else being equal, then trade
must have become less di¢ cult between these two countries and trade costs must have
gone down. Conversely, if output in either country increases without simultaneously lead-
ing to an increase in bilateral trade, then the implied trade costs must have gone up.4
Appendix A.3 shows that expression (20) still holds even when countries run trade decits
or surpluses.5
Given the equilibrium solution of the model, a micro-founded single gravity equation
with EXPj;k as the only dependent trade ow variable can be derived as
EXPj;k = (1   j;k)
( 1)2
2 1 (1  k;j)
( 1)
2 1 (sj)
 1
2 1 (sk)

2 1 
(GDPj   EXPj)

2 1 (GDPk   EXPk)
 1
2 1

POPk
POPj
 1
2 1
(21)
where POPj is the population of country j. As a special feature of gravity equation (21),
the relative population of country k is a determinant of exports from j to k. Intuitively, the
3See Section 2.4 for a discussion of s.
4Head and Ries (2001) compute a U.S.-Canadian border e¤ect based on relative expenditure ratios
but their two-country framework does not consider trade with partners outside North America and thus
does not capture multilateral resistance. It does not allow for nontradable goods either. Head and Mayer
(2004) derive a measure of accessibility of a market or trade freeness in the context of the New
Economic Geography literature. Their measure is similar to the trade cost function (20) but it applies to
specic industries only, whereas (20) holds at a higher level of aggregation. Their measure does not take
into account nontradable goods and it is based on exogenous expenditure shares as opposed to general
equilibrium. Furthermore, the trade cost measure derived in the current paper allows for trade cost
asymmetries and trade imbalances (see equations (22) and (23) and Appendix A.3). In addition, the
current paper emphasizes the evolution of empirical trade costs over time and their determinants (see
Sections 3 and 4).
5Appendix A.3 also demonstrates how to derive a gravity equation that includes imports.
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more people inhabit country k, the more imports they demand from country j.6 Anderson
(1979) points out that although most theoretical models do not lead to gravity equations
that include population, in empirical applications population is nevertheless frequently
used as a regressor and usually found to be signicant. The present model provides a
theoretical underpinning.
The single gravity equation for EXPk;j is like equation (21) but with the j- and k-
indices swapped. Given the two single gravity equations it becomes possible to solve for
trade costs as
 j;k = 1 
(EXPk;j)

 1

POPk
POPj
 1
 1
(EXPj;k) (GDPk   EXPk)
1
 1 (sj)
1
 1
(22)
k;j = 1 
(EXPj;k)

 1

POPj
POPk
 1
 1
(EXPk;j) (GDPj   EXPj)
1
 1 (sk)
1
 1
(23)
Equations (22) and (23) illustrate that bilateral trade costs between two countries can
di¤er depending on the direction of trade. For example, imagine that initially all right-
hand side variables in (22) and (23) are symmetric (EXPj;k = EXPk;j , POPj = POPk
etc.) It follows  j;k = k;j . Then suppose that all else being equal country ks market
potential (GDPk   EXPk) increases, leading to  j;k > k;j . Intuitively, if country k
absorbs more goods domestically without simultaneously demanding more goods from j,
then trade costs from j to k must have gone up.
But computing empirical trade costs on the basis of (22) and (23) yields implausibly
volatile time series of  because the single export series EXPj;k (reported by country j)
and EXPk;j (reported by country k) often diverge erratically from year to year.7 Empirical
bilateral trade costs are therefore computed with expression (20) that makes use of the
symmetry assumption  j;k = k;j .
2.4 Data and Parameter Assumptions
Trade costs are computed on the basis of equation (20). The required export data, de-
nominated in U.S. dollars, are taken from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS),
and the required GDP data come from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS).
The data are annual for a sample of 29 countries, consisting of 23 OECD countries plus
six important South American and Asian countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong,
India and Indonesia).8 For some countries data are available from 1960 until 2002, for
6 If an additional country-k consumer is born, the marginal utility she derives from her rst unit of a
country-j good will be higher than for an existing country-j consumer, resulting in an increase in EXPj;k.
7Appendix A.3 explains the inconsistency problems that arise when trade ow data are reported by
di¤erent countries. See Hummels and Lugovskyy (2006) for a discussion.
8The OECD countries include all current 30 OECD countries exclusive of Belgium/Luxembourg and the
Czech Republic/Slovak Republic who only report jointly. Poland, Portugal and Turkey are not included
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most countries only more recent data are reported. The data appendix provides details.
Computing bilateral trade costs on the basis of gravity equation (20) requires two
parameter assumptions. The rst is  = 11 for the elasticity of substitution, which via
the optimal prices (15) and (16) corresponds to a markup of 10 percent. The elasticity of
substitution is typically estimated to lie near 7 or 8 but many studies nd higher values.9
For example, under the assumption of homogeneity across industries Head and Ries (2001)
obtain an estimate of 11:4 for the elasticity of substitution. Eaton and Kortum (2002)
estimate  to be 9:28.
Intuitively, a lower  means that consumers are less sensitive to prices and trade
costs. They should therefore be expected to trade more. To reconcile the lower price
elasticity with observed trade ows, a lower  tends to shift the level of trade costs upwards.
Fortunately, the percentage change of trade costs over time, a main focus of this paper,
is considerably less dependent on . For example, under  = 11 the tari¤ equivalent of
U.S.-Canadian trade costs between 1960 and 2002 declined by 39:2 percent from 40:8 to
24:8 percent. Cutting the elasticity of substitution to  = 8 would result in a decline of
40:7 percent from 63:1 to 37:4 percent.10
The second assumed parameter is the fraction s of the range of rms that produce
tradable goods. Stockman and Tesar (1990) say that this fraction is di¢ cult to estimate
directly from the databut report evidence that the expenditure on nontradable goods as
a share of private nal consumption ranges from 18:9 to 44:3 percent for ve large OECD
countries (France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States) between 1960 and
1988. As my sample includes many smaller countries, the appropriate share of nontradable
goods is likely to be closer to the lower end of this range. I therefore choose s = 0:8,
implying that the fraction of the range of goods that are nontradable is 20 percent across
all economies.
Given the general decrease in trade costs over the last decades, one might expect
that more goods have become tradable, as suggested in the literature on endogenous
tradability, for instance by Bergin and Glick (2006). However, the IMF nds in a recent
empirical analysis of globalization that based on sectoral input-output tables unlike in
many emerging market countries, the tradables sector share output in most industrial
countries has actually fallen slightly in recent years because of the rapid expansion of
service sectors(IMF 2005, p. 131). Since my sample includes both industrial countries
and some emerging market economies, the overall e¤ect on s is unclear. But even if there
has been a slight downward trend in s, the resulting additional decrease in trade costs
would be small. For example, cutting s from 0:8 to 0:75 would merely reduce the 2002
because of limited data availability.
9See the survey given in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004, Section 3.6).
10The regression results in Section 4 are not qualitatively a¤ected when trade costs are computed with
 = 5 instead of  = 11, see the discussion in Section 4.3.
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tari¤ equivalent of U.S.-Canadian trade costs from 24:8 to 24:1 percent.
3 Trade Costs over Time
Most empirical studies estimate trade costs for a given period only.11 Using annual data
for 1960-2002, this section examines how bilateral trade costs have evolved over time. Its
guiding question is By how much and how quickly have trade costs fallen (if at all) for
which country pairs? Comprehensive iceberg trade costs are computed on the basis of
equation (20) and then converted into the tari¤ equivalent through (5).
3.1 Bilateral Trade Costs in the U.S. and UK
This subsection scrutinizes bilateral trade costs for the United States and for the United
Kingdom as two eminent examples. The UK is picked as the second biggest European
economy after Germany whose data show a structural break in the wake of reunication.
Table 1 gives a snapshot of U.S. bilateral trade costs for the years 1960 and 2002. U.S.
bilateral trade costs have fallen with almost all trading partners in the sample except for
slight increases in the cases of Chile and Iceland. The decline in trade costs has been
most dramatic for the two adjacent countries Canada and Mexico but also for Ireland and
Korea which have experienced strong economic growth relative to other countries in the
sample.
The levels of the tari¤ equivalents across countries vary substantially from 24:8 percent
for Canada up to 171 percent for Greece in 2002. The average magnitude is consistent with
values typically put forward in the literature. For example, Anderson and van Wincoop
(2004, p. 692) nd that the representative tari¤ equivalent of international trade costs is
74 percent.
Table 2 is the UK counterpart to Table 1. Unlike the United States the UK displays
a number of remarkable increases in trade costs between 1960 and 2002, mostly with
former colonies that are far away such as Australia, Canada, India and New Zealand.
The increases seem less staggering if one takes into account that the initial 1960 tari¤
equivalents for these countries are comparatively low. What the U.S. and the UK have in
common is that except for Korea the most dramatic declines in trade costs have occurred
with nearby countries, in this case France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain.
These countries also exhibit the lowest levels of trade costs.
11Amongst others, exceptions are Hummels (1999) who considers transportation costs, Head and Mayer
(2000) who investigate border e¤ects within the European Union from 1976 to 1995 and Coulombe (2005)
who investigates the U.S.-Canadian border e¤ect between 1981 and 2000.
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Table 1: U.S. Bilateral Trade Costs
Tari¤ equivalent 
Partner country 1960 2002 Percentage change
Argentina 77:9
Australia 77:0 66:1  14:2
Austria 76:7
Brazil 59:7
Canada 40:8 24:8  39:2
Chile 67:8 68:4 +0:9
Denmark 80:5
Finland 92:3 76:7  16:9
France 73:6 61:0  17:1
Germany 62:9 53:4  15:1
Greece 171:0
Hungary 85:9
Iceland 92:3 96:5 +4:6
India 75:4 73:6  2:4
Indonesia 69:2
Ireland 88:7 46:8  47:2
Italy 69:8 65:6  6:0
Japan 57:7 50:6  12:3
Korea 103:3 49:9  51:7
Mexico 58:5 30:9  47:2
Netherlands 61:3 53:6  12:6
New Zealand 78:9 74:8  5:2
Norway 78:9
Poland 101:6
Portugal 92:3
Spain 83:8 79:5  5:1
Sweden 75:1 68:6  8:7
Switzerland 70:9 61:0  14:0
Turkey 79:9
UK 60:3 54:1  10:3
All values are percentage values.
Blank cells: data not available.
Computations based on (5) and (20).
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Table 2: UK Bilateral Trade Costs
Tari¤ equivalent 
Partner country 1960 2002 Percentage change
Argentina 98:0
Australia 44:5 66:9 +50:3
Austria 61:8
Brazil 79:9
Canada 47:5 67:8 +42:7
Chile 70:4 87:6 +24:4
Denmark 52:4
Finland 52:9 56:7 +7:2
France 64:7 41:6  35:7
Germany 57:7 38:9  32:6
Greece 79:9 137:5 +72:1
Hungary 61:3
Iceland 75:1 73:6  2:0
India 57:0 72:7 +27:5
Indonesia 81:8
Ireland 36:4 23:0  36:8
Italy 64:2 50:8  20:9
Japan 81:8 70:9  13:3
Korea 124:2 68:4  44:9
Mexico 95:3 94:6  0:7
Netherlands 45:3 32:6  28:0
New Zealand 39:3 79:2 +101:5
Norway 50:2
Poland 67:2
Portugal 61:0
Spain 68:9 49:4  28:3
Sweden 49:0 51:1 +4:2
Switzerland 62:3 55:3  11:2
Turkey 66:7
United States 60:3 54:1  10:3
All values are percentage values.
Blank cells: data not available.
Computations based on (5) and (20).
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3.2 The G7 and European Union Countries
Bilateral trade costs are computed amongst the G7 countries between 1960 and 2002.12
Figure 1 plots each countrys average bilateral tari¤ equivalent with the other G7 countries,
weighted by each trading partners share of combined G7 exports.
As Figure 1 shows, all seven countries have experienced a steady decline in their
average tari¤ equivalents. The decline is strongest for Canada, resulting in the lowest
2002 tari¤ equivalent (26:6 percent), and the decline is weakest for Japan, resulting in the
highest 2002 tari¤ equivalent (55:3 percent). In a world of increased regional economic
integration it is not surprising that the Japanese decline is the least pronounced, given
that geographically Japan is most isolated from the other G7 countries.13
The top graph in Figure 2 depicts the average of the graphs in Figure 1, weighted
by each countrys share of total exports amongst G7 countries. The values of the top
graph can be interpreted as the representative intra-G7 tari¤ equivalent. Between 1960
and 2002 it fell by 26:5 percent from 55 to 40:5 percent, consistent with the 74 percent
tari¤ equivalent of international trade costs suggested by Anderson and van Wincoop
(2004) for a broader range of countries. As a comparison, the bottom graph plots the
tari¤ equivalent based on the world c.i.f./f.o.b. ratio that is reported by the IMF as a
measure of transportation costs. It dropped from 7:6 percent in 1960 to 3:3 percent in
2002. Anderson and van Wincoop suggest a higher value for transportation costs (10:7
percent) but in either case, transportation costs constitute only a fraction of overall trade
costs.14
As for the G7 subsample, trade costs are weighted and averaged for a subsample of
13 European Union (EU) countries between 1977 and 2002.15 The 2002 average tari¤
equivalent is highest for Greece with 122 percent and lowest for the Netherlands with 33
percent. Between 1977 and 2002 the representative intra-EU tari¤ equivalent fell by 17:7
percent from 47:5 to 39:1 percent. The corresponding representative G7 values are 45:1
and 40:5 percent so that in comparison, EU trade costs were higher in 1977 but slightly
lower in 2002. Over the past 30 years trade costs have therefore fallen more rapidly
within the European Union than amongst G7 countries. This nding is consistent with
the previous observation that economic integration has increased fastest amongst nearby
countries.
12The G7 countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the U.S.
13Japan is not only geographically the most isolated amongst the G7 countries. Japan does not share a
common language, a colonial history nor a free trade agreement with any other G7 country, see Section 4.
14See Anderson and van Wincoop (2004, Section 2.2) for a discussion of transportation costs. The
c.i.f./f.o.b. tari¤ equivalent is computed from the world import and export series reported in the IMF
Direction of Trade Statistics. These data should be treated with caution though since their quality is
questionable, see Hummels and Lugovskyy (2006) for a discussion.
15The 13 EU countries are the 15 EU member countries prior to the 2004 Eastern enlargement exclusive
of Belgium/Luxembourg who only report jointly. Some data prior to 1977 are missing.
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Figure 1: Weighted averages of bilateral trade costs amongst G7 countries (measured as
tari¤ equivalent).
15
Figure 2: G7 trade costs and the IMF world c.i.f./f.o.b. ratio (both measured as tari¤
equivalent).
3.3 An Increase in Regional Economic Integration
Tables 1 and 2 exhibit the pattern that U.S. and UK bilateral trade costs have fallen most
dramatically for nearby trading partners. In fact, this pattern applies more generally for
the sample of 29 countries described in Section 2.4, suggesting that over the past few
decades there has been an increase in regional economic integration.
Table 3 formally demonstrates for a panel of 339 country pairs that regional integration
has improved between 1970 and 2000. In a regression of the percentage decline in tari¤
equivalents, the coe¢ cient of the logarithm of distance is negative and signicant. This
result holds up even if intra-European trade relations are not included in the sample.16
In other words, although absolute trade ows have increased for virtually all country
pairs, relative trade ows have been diverted towards nearby countries. Coughlin (2004)
comes to the same conclusion from the perspective of individual U.S. states in an analysis
of merchandise exports. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) nd evidence of relative trade
diversion in that the formation of the European Community lowered the growth in trade
with other industrial countries by 1:7 percentage points. The results in Table 3 suggest
that the diversion of relative trade to nearby countries did not only take place amongst
16 In results not reported here, in both regressions the t is even better if the level of distance is used as
a regressor.
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Table 3: The Decline in Tari¤ Equivalents  and Distance
Percentage decline in jk, 1970-2000
Constant 0:537
(4:20)
0:306
(0:58)
ln(Distance)  0:062
( 5:67)
 0:058
( 2:14)
Country xed e¤ects yes yes
Intra-European pairs included yes no
Number of observations 339 224
R2 0.555 0.527
The dependent variable is the percentage decline in jk,
dened as (jk;1970   jk;2000)=jk;1970.
Robust OLS estimation, t-statistics given in parentheses.
** and * indicate signicance at the 1 and 5 percent levels.
European nations. Similarly, Frankel, Stein and Wei (1997) identify the Americas, Europe
and Pacic Asia as continental trading blocs that have a high degree of internal integration.
As free trade agreements have typically been concluded with nearby countries, they
have certainly contributed to the increase in regional economic integration, see Venables
(2001) for a discussion. Another reason could be evidence reported by Hummels (1999)
that over recent years the cost of overland transport has declined relative to ocean trans-
port, which might have disproportionately favored shorter distances.
4 The Determinants of Trade Costs
Trade costs can vary substantially across country pairs. An obvious question to ask
is which factors can explain this variation. For instance, why is the G7 average tari¤
equivalent so much lower for Canada (26:6 percent) than for Japan (55:3 percent)? A
trade cost panel of 339 country pairs for the years 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 is used in
an attempt to explain this variation.17
The factors that have the potential to explain trade costs can be divided into three
rough groups. The rst group consists of geographical factors like distance between two
trading partners and contiguity. Both distance and contiguity can be seen as proxies
for transportation costs and information costs which tend to be lower for nearby trading
partners.
The second group of potential determinants of trade costs is formed by historical
factors. These include variables that capture whether two countries had a colonial rela-
17The trade cost panel includes the following 29 countries (but not all possible country pair combi-
nations): Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Hong Kong, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the U.S. The 1970 tari¤ data are
incomplete such that only 273 observations can be included for that year.
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tionship in the past (e.g. the UK and Australia) and whether they share the same o¢ cial
language. Countries that had a colonial relationship in the past often have strong histor-
ical trade linkages and countries with the same o¢ cial language might nd it easier to
communicate.
The third group of trade cost determinants consists of institutional factors. Two
obvious candidates in this group are tari¤s and free trade agreements. Another factor that
potentially determines trade costs is nominal exchange rate volatility. If exchange rate
volatility is reduced, exchange rate risk decreases and trade should become less costly.18
Most of the variables just mentioned are common regressors in the gravity literature,
for example in Rose (2000) and Fitzgerald (2005). The variables are usually regarded
ex ante as trade cost components and have therefore been directly included into gravity
regressions. If such traditional gravity regressions are estimated with the present data set,
the coe¢ cients fall squarely into the range typically suggested in the gravity literature.
One can therefore exclude the possibility that the results reported in the following are
driven by peculiarities of the particular sample.
4.1 Baseline Results
Trade costs are linked to their determinants by the following baseline regression
jkt = 0 + 1 ln(Distancejk) + 2Common Borderjk + 3Colonialjk
+4Common Languagejk + 5Tariffsjkt
+6FTAjkt + 7ERV olatilityjkt + "jkt
(24)
ln(Distancejk) denotes the natural logarithm of distance in km between countries j and
k. Common Borderjk is a contiguity dummy which takes on the value 1 if the two trading
partners share a common border. Colonialjk is a dummy indicating a past colonial rela-
tionship between j and k. The Common Languagejk dummy indicates whether the two
countries have the same o¢ cial language. All these geographical and historical regressors
do not change over time.
But the institutional regressors are time-variant. Tariffsjkt is a joint measure of tari¤s
for countries j and k that is based on country ratings of tari¤ regimes published by the
Fraser Institute in the Freedom of the World Report. The joint measure is constructed
by multiplying the single-country ratings and then taking natural logarithms. FTAjkt is
a dummy variable for free trade agreements such as NAFTA and the European Common
Market. ERV olatilityjkt measures the volatility of the nominal exchange rate between
j and k over the ve years preceding t as the standard deviation of the rst di¤erences
of the monthly logarithmic nominal exchange rates.19 "jkt is the error term. The data
18Anderson (2004) surveys the role of informal institutions, for example corruption and predation.
19A common currency dummy does not make much sense in this particular sample because it would
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Table 4: Baseline Regression (24)
Regression
Regressors Pooled 1970 1980 1990 2000
Geographical factors
ln(Distance) 0:109
(9:38)
0:097
(4:28)
0:065
(3:03)
0:113
(4:40)
0:182
(7:86)
Common Border  0:154
( 5:88)
 0:081
( 1:39)
 0:183
( 3:58)
 0:179
( 3:41)
 0:115
( 1:81)
Historical factors
Common Language  0:189
( 10:30)
 0:262
( 5:62)
 0:190
( 5:79)
 0:188
( 5:10)
 0:204
( 5:57)
Colonial  0:223
( 6:41)
 0:480
( 5:92)
 0:205
( 3:40)
 0:184
( 3:55)
 0:099
( 2:24)
Institutional factors
Tari¤s 0:032
(6:97)
0:182
(3:48)
0:031
(4:81)
0:032
(4:47)
0:302
(5:13)
Free Trade Agreement 0:019
(0:65)
 0:258
( 5:03)
 0:123
( 2:65)
0:122
(1:97)
0:170
(3:02)
Exchange Rate Volatility 0:007
(3:37)
 0:016
( 1:70)
0:012
(2:72)
0:012
(4:14)
 0:020
( 4:60)
1980 dummy  0:069
( 2:47)
1990 dummy  0:093
( 3:29)
2000 dummy  0:126
( 4:64)
Constant 0:145
(1:43)
0:921
(3:58)
0:436
(2:30)
 0:043
( 0:19)
0:586
(1:73)
Number of observations 1290 273 339 339 399
R2 0.252 0.255 0.294 0.282 0.307
The dependent variable is the tari¤ equivalent jkt.
Robust OLS estimation, t-statistics given in parentheses.
** indicates signicance at the 1 percent level.
appendix explains the variables in more detail and gives the exact data sources.
Note that the dependent variable is the tari¤ equivalent jkt, not iceberg trade costs
 jkt. This choice renders the interpretation of the  coe¢ cients more intuitive. In regres-
sion (24) the individual s represent the percentage point changes in the tari¤ equivalent
in response to marginal changes in the regressors. The choice of the tari¤ equivalent over
iceberg trade costs leaves the statistical signicance of the regressors virtually una¤ected.20
Table 4 reports the results of regression (24), both for pooled data and individual years.
In the pooled regression all geographical, historical and institutional variables have the
expected signs and are signicant at the 1 percent level except for the free trade agreement
dummy. The year-specic dummies are negative, reecting the drop in trade costs over
time.
only apply to the eurozone countries for the year 2000. Instead, currency arrangements are reected in
low eurozone exchange rate volatilities for 1995-1999.
20The correlation of  and  is over 95 percent.
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The quantitative e¤ects of the dummy variables are strongest for the historical factors.
If two countries had a colonial relationship, their bilateral tari¤ equivalent is 22 percentage
points lower compared to two countries without a mutual colonial relationship. But note
from the single-year regressions that this impact of a common colonial history has washed
out over time. Sharing the same o¢ cial language reduces the tari¤ equivalent by 19
percentage points.
As the institutional variables change over time, their coe¢ cients are more di¢ cult to
interpret. Tari¤s are signicant in all single years. Between 1990 and 2000 there was a
marked drop in tari¤s, leading to an increase in the magnitude of the 2000 coe¢ cient.
Similarly, the number of free trade agreements has increased over time, especially between
1990 and 2000. The unexpected positive coe¢ cients for 1990 and 2000 might arise because
the e¤ects of free trade agreements take time to materialize. Indeed, using the 1980 trade
agreement values in the regressions for 1990 and 2000 yields the expected negative signs.
Exchange rate volatility in the panel increased markedly after the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system, explaining the positive and signicant coe¢ cients for 1980 and
1990, but decreased considerably during the 1990s. As Table 5 demonstrates, however,
exchange rate volatility is no longer signicant once country xed e¤ects are included.
4.2 Fixed E¤ects and Additional Regressors
It might be the case that the baseline results presented in Table 4 are driven by country-
specic characteristics that cannot be observed. In order to control for this possibility,
country xed e¤ects are included. Indeed, a likelihood ratio test overwhelmingly rejects
the pooled baseline regression in favor of a xed e¤ects specication. The R2 is also
markedly enhanced by country xed e¤ects. These results hint at a sizeable degree of
heterogeneity across countries.
In addition, trade costs might also be determined by factors that so far have been
omitted. I therefore augment baseline regression (24) by six additional variables that are
less frequently used in the gravity literature. Three of the additional variables represent
geographical features, namely the trading partnersjoint surface area, a landlocked vari-
able and an island variable. The landlocked and island variables take on the value 1 if
one of the trading partners is landlocked or an island and the value 2 if both partners
are landlocked or islands. The remaining three variables indicate institutional features,
namely the governmentsshares of consumption, ination rates and the extent of capital
controls. These three variables are also based on country ratings published in the Free-
dom of the World Report. Again, the joint measures are constructed by multiplying the
single-country ratings and then taking natural logarithms. The data appendix explains
the additional regressors in more detail. Table 5 reports the results of the augmented xed
e¤ects regressions.
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Table 5: Fixed E¤ects and Additional Regressors
Regression
Regressors Pooled 1970 1980 1990 2000
Geographical factors
ln(Distance) 0:168
(25:94)
0:159
(10:77)
0:196
(16:04)
0:172
(10:73)
0:162
(11:74)
Common Border 0:006
(0:31)
0:034
(0:78)
0:011
(0:28)
0:007
(0:17)
 0:019
( 0:49)
Area 0:049
(15:67)
0:051
(6:23)
 0:009
( 2:35)
0:003
(1:25)
0:003
(1:38)
Landlocked 0:218
(7:54)
 0:073
( 1:53)
0:196
(5:74)
0:245
(7:61)
0:252
(8:65)
Island  0:196
( 6:77)
 0:365
( 5:61)
 0:040
( 0:43)
0:192
(6:98)
0:332
(4:82)
Historical factors
Common Language  0:103
( 6:82)
 0:147
( 4:26)
 0:128
( 3:89)
 0:086
( 2:85)
 0:071
( 2:94)
Colonial  0:160
( 6:34)
 0:237
( 5:40)
 0:182
( 5:94)
 0:143
( 4:17)
 0:085
( 2:49)
Institutional factors
Tari¤s 0:007
(1:69)
0:134
(2:84)
0:033
(2:42)
0:049
(9:83)
 0:000
( 0:46)
Free Trade Agreement  0:054
( 3:85)
 0:135
( 3:77)
0:054
(1:84)
 0:034
( 1:09)
 0:044
( 1:59)
Exchange Rate Volatility 0:001
(0:37)
0:023
(1:28)
 0:020
( 1:42)
0:002
(0:16)
0:011
(0:78)
Gov. Consumption 0:023
(1:44)
 0:080
( 0:79)
0:094
(5:12)
0:266
(12:04)
0:225
(10:32)
Ination 0:000
(0:01)
 0:337
( 2:61)
0:050
(4:03)
0:015
(1:43)
0:000
(0:07)
Capital Controls 0:002
(0:91)
0:002
(0:27)
0:019
(1:44)
0:005
(1:31)
0:002
(8:73)
1980 dummy  0:074
( 4:77)
1990 dummy  0:085
( 5:40)
2000 dummy  0:150
( 7:72)
Constant  1:562
( 12:89)
 2:690
( 5:54)
 0:178
( 1:23)
0:049
(0:30)
0:759
(0:74)
Country xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 1290 273 339 339 339
R2 0.859 0.848 0.887 0.893 0.895
The dependent variable is the tari¤ equivalent jkt.
Robust OLS estimation, t-statistics given in parentheses.
** indicates signicance at the 1 percent level.
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As in the baseline specication of Table 4 the distance coe¢ cient is highly signicant
and similar in magnitude over time, an observation which is consistent with the meta-
analysis by Disdier and Head (2005) who consider 1052 distance e¤ects stemming from 78
di¤erent studies. Apart from the year 2000 the language and colonial dummies are also
highly signicant but have become less important over time. In particular, the language
estimate is in line with Hummels(2001) nding and Eaton and Kortums (2002) estimate
for 1990 data. The nding that the language coe¢ cient has subsided over time does not
necessarily mean though that speaking the same language is less important nowadays.
The lower language barrier might simply reect the fact that an increasing number of
people across the world have learned English as a foreign language.21
The area, landlocked and island regressors have the expected signs and are signicant
in the pooled regression. But it is striking that after 1970 area is no longer a signicant
impediment to trade. This nding suggests that infrastructure might have been built
that helped overcome the di¢ culties associated with large internal distances. Being an
island was an advantage in 1970 but then turned into a disadvantage, possibly because
the benets of having easy access to the sea have faded and the costs of being on the
geographical periphery have increased.22
If two countries are part of the same free trade agreement, their bilateral trade costs
are reduced by about ve percentage points. Tari¤s are no longer signicant for 1980
and 2000. The government consumption variable has a positive and signicant coe¢ cient
after 1970 when government consumption as a fraction of total GDP was highest. This
is likely to reect the fact that governments spend their budgets disproportionately on
domestically produced goods and domestic labor. Ination was only an impediment to
trade in 1980 when its level was generally high. Capital controls show up as an impediment
to trade in 2000 only.
More generally, it can be concluded that the e¤ects of institutional factors are less
persistent and steady than those of geographical and historical factors. This nding is
consistent with the relatively small role that policy related barriers play in determining
total trade costs. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) calculate that policy related barriers
including tari¤s and trade agreements make up only eight out of the 44 percentage points
associated with border related barriers.
4.3 Discussion
The empirical results of Tables 4 and 5 are generally consistent with estimates reported in
the literature. However, some special attention is warranted for the border and exchange
21For example, see the British Councils report on the English language made available at http://www.
britishcouncil.org/english/pdf/future.pdf.
22There are seven islands in the sample: Australia, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand and
the UK.
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rate volatility variables, the xed e¤ects as well as the free trade agreement dummy.
In the pooled baseline regression of Table 4 the benecial e¤ect of sharing a common
border is highly signicant. Being neighboring countries reduces the tari¤ equivalent by
15 percentage points. An interesting observation is that once country xed e¤ects are
taken into account in Table 5, the contiguity e¤ect completely disappears. This nding
suggests that without xed e¤ects a border dummy might erroneously pick up country-
specic characteristics. Similarly, exchange rate volatility is no longer signicant when
xed e¤ects are included, indicating that this variable, too, might otherwise erroneously
pick up country-specic features. The same caution should be exercised when making
inference about these regressors in traditional gravity equations. Indeed, Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003) point out the xed e¤ects specication as a consistent estimation
method for gravity equations.
The country xed e¤ects themselves carry important information. They are positive
and signicant for Greece and Iceland but they are negative and signicant for Brazil,
Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.S.23 It is di¢ cult
to give a general explanation for these e¤ects because by construction they capture unob-
served characteristics. But at least in the case of Greece the excessive level of trade costs
might be related to poor data quality.24
It might at rst seem surprising that the e¤ects of free trade agreements are so limited.
Once country xed e¤ects are included into the pooled regressions, the tari¤ equivalent
drops by merely ve percentage points when two countries conclude a free trade agree-
ment. As mentioned earlier though, using lagged values bolsters the estimated magnitudes
because the benecial e¤ects of free trade agreements need time to materialize. But in
general, time series evidence suggests that the e¤ects of trade agreements are moderate.
For example, Head and Mayer (2000) are unable to associate the implementation of the
1986 Single European Act with a signicant drop in EU trade costs. In the same vein,
Rose (2004) nds that WTO membership does not lead to a signicant change of trade
patterns.
A number of robustness checks have been performed for the results of Tables 4 and
5. Computing trade costs based on an elasticity of substitution  = 5 instead of  = 11
leaves the signicance and signs of coe¢ cients virtually unchanged. Furthermore, the
residuals of the trade cost regressions might be spatially correlated because if a certain
country is hit by a shock, its neighbors are more likely a¤ected than remote countries.
23 It is not possible to include country random e¤ects instead of country xed e¤ects because each
observation is associated with two countries. The random e¤ects specication becomes an option though
for country-pair e¤ects. However, a Hausman test resoundingly rejects country-pair random e¤ects in
favor of country-pair xed e¤ects. When country-pair xed e¤ects are included, the coe¢ cients reported
in Table 5 for the institutional factors are virtually unchanged. But of course, country-pair xed e¤ects
absorb the time-invariant geographical and historical factors and are therefore less informative.
24The Greek GDP gures are extraordinarily high relative to trade ows, resulting in high trade costs.
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To check for this possibility, I regress the residuals on continental dummies but nd only
weak correlation for the regressions of Table 4 and no spatial correlation at all for the xed
e¤ects specications of Table 5.25 In addition, trade cost regressions that allow for cluster
e¤ects associated with individual countries or continents produce results very similar to
those in Tables 4 and 5.
Finally, my results are not sensitive to the exclusion of particular countries like the
U.S. or UK from the sample. As long as country xed e¤ects are taken into account,
the results are not even sensitive to the exclusion of all intra-European trade relations.
Similarly, the results hold up when the sample is restricted to trade relations between rich
countries.26
The period after World War II is not unprecedented as a time of enormous trade
expansion and forceful international economic integration. The rst era of globalization
is generally considered to be the trade boom that started in the late 19th century and
continued until the beginning of World War I. Using the model developed in the present
paper, Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2006) nd that the average tari¤ equivalent of trade
costs stood at 72 percent in 1870 and at 61 percent in 1913, implying a drop of 15 percent
over four decades. In comparison, the average G7 tari¤ equivalent declined more rapidly
from 55 percent in 1960 to 40:5 percent in 2002, a drop of 26:5 percent over four decades.
Apart from distance, important determinants of 19th century trade costs were tari¤s,
railroad infrastructure, exchange rate regime coordination through the Gold Standard
and, similar to the post-World War II period, a common colonial history as well as the
use of a common language.
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a new micro-founded measure of international trade costs. It is based
on a multi-country general equilibrium model of trade with bilateral iceberg trade costs as
its central ingredient. The model results in a gravity equation from which the implied trade
costs can be computed as a comprehensive measure of international trade barriers. The
measure is intuitive, takes into account multilateral resistance and can easily be computed
using directly observable variables only.
The empirical results obtained through the trade cost measure are economically sen-
sible and consistent with the literature. During the post-World War II period trade costs
25The dummies are dened as intracontinental binary variables (for North America, South America,
Europe, Asia and Oceania), i.e. they only take on the value 1 if both countries in a pair are on the same
continent.
26Rich countries are dened as those with per-capita income of over US$ 20,000 in 2002 according to UN
data. This threshold excludes the South American countries as well as Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Korea and Spain. The exclusion of non-rich countries cuts the sample size by more
than half (by 690 observations in the pooled data set).
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have declined markedly. For the G7 countries they fell by 26:5 percent between 1960
and 2002, and for European Union countries trade costs decreased by 17:7 percent be-
tween 1977 and 2002. For both subsamples the 2002 tari¤ equivalent of trade costs stood
at roughly 40 percent. In addition, the paper nds clear evidence that over the past
few decades, relative trade ows have been diverted away from remote trading partners
towards nearby countries, implying an increase in regional economic integration.
The dispersion of trade costs across country pairs can best be explained by geographical
factors like distance but also by historical factors. Sharing a common colonial history cuts
the tari¤ equivalent by 16 percentage points, whereas having the same o¢ cial language
reduces trade barriers by 10 percentage points. Institutional factors such as free trade
agreements, tari¤s and exchange rate volatility also matter but generally have a smaller
impact. For example, entering a free trade agreement on average decreases trade costs by
only 5 percentage points.
After controlling for these factors trade costs still vary considerably across countries,
indicating a high degree of heterogeneity. Trade costs tend be high for Greece and Iceland
but low for Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the
United States.
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A A Model with Iceberg Trade Costs
This appendix outlines how to derive the theoretical results presented in Section 2. Ap-
pendix A.1 focuses on the equilibrium solution of the model. Appendix A.2 derives the
results of Section 2.3. Appendix A.3 demonstrates how to derive a gravity equation that
includes imports and shows that the trade cost expression (20) holds even when countries
run trade decits or surpluses.
Since within one country all rms producing tradable goods are symmetric and all
rms producing nontradable goods are also symmetric, the index i will be dropped in the
following.
A.1 Equilibrium of the Model
Each country-j consumer maximizes utility (1) subject to budget constraint (7), leading
to the optimal labor supply condition

1  Lj =
Wj
PjCj
(25)
In order to solve the model it is useful to dene per-capita output, per-capita labor supply
and per-capita prots as
yj  sjyTj + (1  sj)yNTj (26)
Lj  sjLTj + (1  sj)LNTj (27)
j  sjTj + (1  sj)NTj
where yTj is the same as y
T
ji from (8), L
T
j is the same L
T
ji as from (11) and 
T
j is the same
as Tji from (14). The remaining right-hand side variables are the corresponding variables
for nontradable rm i. Using the production functions (9) and (10) as well as the price
markups (15)-(17) it follows
j = pjyj  WjLj
Combined with budget constraint (7) and the optimal labor supply condition (25) this
yields the optimal per-capita labor supply
Lj =
  1
  1 +  (28)
Express nominal wages across countries as
1W1 = 2W2 = ::: = jWj = ::: = JWJ
where the s are auxiliary parameters yet unknown. It follows from the price markups
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(15)-(17) that
pk = p
T
k =

  1
Wk
Ak
=

  1
j
k
Wj
Ak
(29)
Use (29) in price index (3) to derive
Pj = !
1
1 
j

  1Wj
where
!j 
 
JX
k=1
sk(nk   nk 1)(Ak (1  k;j) k
j
) 1
!
+ (1  sj) (nj   nj 1)A 1j (30)
An expression for the real wage follows directly as
Wj
Pj
=
  1

!
1
 1
j (31)
Using budget constraint (7) and the optimal labor supply condition (25), expressions for
consumption and real prots follow as
Cj = Lj!
1
 1
j (32)
j
Pj
=
Lj

!
1
 1
j (33)
as well as
Ck = Cj

!k
!j
 1
 1
(34)
To solve for the s in (30), start o¤ with (26) and plug in the market-clearing condi-
tions (12) and (13). Then substitute in for prices and consumption using (15)-(17), (29),
(31) and (34) to yield
yj
Aj
= Cj!
 
 1
j
( 
JP
k=1
sk(nk   nk 1)(Ak (1  k;j)) 1
 
!j
!k
sj
sk

Aj
Ak
(1 j;k)
(1 k;j)
 1!
k
j
 !
+ (1  sj) (nj   nj 1)A 1j
)
(35)
From the production functions (9) and (10), denitions (26) and (27) and expression (32)
it follows
Lj =
yj
Aj
= Cj!
 1
 1
j
It must therefore be the case that the curly brackets in (35) are equal to !j as dened in
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(30). Setting the curly brackets equal to !j and using (30) yields
k
j
=
 
!j
!k
sj
sk

Aj
Ak
(1   j;k)
(1  k;j)
 1! 12 1
(36)
Finally, plug (36) back into (30) to obtain
!j =
0@ JP
k=1
sk(nk   nk 1)(Ak (1  k;j)) 1
 
!j
!k
sj
sk

Aj
Ak
(1 j;k)
(1 k;j)
 1!  12 11A
+(1  sj) (nj   nj 1)A 1j
(37)
The system of polynomial equations represented by (37) for j = 1; 2;:::; J cannot be solved
analytically. However, it can be established numerically by repeated substitution that a
unique solution exists for the !s for all combinations of admissible exogenous parameter
values. The admissible parameter values are 0 < nk nk 1 < 1, 0 < sk  1,  > 1, Ak > 0
and 0  k;j < 1 for all j; k. The implicit function theorem can be applied to compute the
partial e¤ects of changes in exogenous parameters on the !s.
The !s give rise to sensible general equilibrium e¤ects for the real wage, consumption
and real prots in equations (31)-(33). For example, a technology improvement in Aj
increases !j and therefore the real wage, consumption and real prots for country-j citizens
but, to a smaller extent, it also increases the other !s and is thus also benecial to foreign
citizens.
A.2 A Gravity Equation with Trade Costs
In order to derive gravity equation (21), plug the market-clearing condition (12) into the
right-hand side of (18) and use the country-j version of (29), (36) and the country-k
versions of (31) and (32). Use production function (9) and rearrange to yield

!j
!k
  1
2 1
=
!jL
T
j;k

Aj
Ak
(1 j;k)
(1 k;j)
 ( 1)
2 1
Lk

sk
sj
 
2 1
(nk   nk 1)(Aj (1   j;k)) 1
(38)
Plug the left-hand side of (38) into the right-hand side of (37), noting that Lj = Lk from
(28) and using (11) and (27). Also note that LTj;j = L
NT
j as p
T
j = p
NT
j through (17). Solve
for !j to obtain
!j =
(nj   nj 1)A 1j Lj
LTj;j
(39)
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Plug the country-j and country-k versions of (39) back into the right-hand side of expres-
sion (18) and then rearrange to obtain
EXPj;k = (1   j;k)
( 1)2
2 1 (1  k;j)
( 1)
2 1 (sj)
 1
2 1 (sk)

2 1 
(nj   nj 1)yTj;j
 
2 1

(nk   nk 1)yTk;k
  1
2 1

nk nk 1
nj nj 1
 1
2 1
(40)
Finally, note that POPj = (nj   nj 1) and POPk = (nk   nk 1). Also note from (26)
that GDPj = (nj   nj 1)yj and
(nj   nj 1)yj = sj(nj   nj 1)yTj + (1  sj)(nj   nj 1)yNTj
and by denition (8)
sj(nj   nj 1)yTj;j = sj(nj   nj 1)yTj   sj(nj   nj 1)
X
k 6=j
yTj;k
Using yNTj = y
NT
j;j = y
T
j;j as p
NT
j = p
T
j it follows
(nj   nj 1)yTj;j = (nj   nj 1)yj   sj(nj   nj 1)
X
k 6=j
yTj;k = GDPj   EXPj
The same applies to GDPk   EXPk. Gravity equation (21) can now be obtained by
plugging POPj , POPk, GDPj  EXPj and GDPk  EXPk into (40). The corresponding
gravity equation for EXPk;j follows analogously.
Given the two single gravity equations for EXPj;k and EXPk;j , one can easily solve
for  j;k and k;j separately as in (22) and (23). In order to derive gravity equation (19),
solve (22) and (23) for (1   j;k) and (1  k;j) and multiply them by each other.
A.3 Imports and Trade Imbalances
All gravity equations in Section 2.3 are cast in exports but for completeness imports are
mentioned here. The relationship between exports and imports is particularly simple,
given by
IMPj;k = (1   j;k)EXPj;k (41)
where IMPj;k are real imports from j arriving in k. Although its simple form looks
inviting, it is not recommended to compute trade costs on the basis of (41) due to in-
consistencies of the export data (reported by country j) and import data (reported by
country k). These inconsistencies of the IMF DOTS data come about through di¤erences
in classication concepts, time of recording, valuation and coverage of trade ows across
countries. See Hummels and Lugovskyy (2006) for a discussion. Using relation (41) the
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import version of gravity equation (20) follows as
 j;k = k;j = 1 

IMPj;kIMPk;j
(GDPj   EXPj) (GDPk   EXPk) s2
 1
2
But since both import and export variables show up in this expression and given the data
inconsistencies, the import version is not used to compute bilateral trade costs.
Many countries run trade decits or surpluses that are often persistent. Trade imbal-
ances are therefore integrated into the model and it is shown that equation (20) remains
una¤ected. The per-capita budget constraint (7) is generalized to
PjCj +
JX
l=1
Tj;l =WjLj + j (42)
where Tj;l are nominal per-capita transfers from country j to l. As an accounting identity
it follows
(nj   nj 1)Tj;l =  (nl   nl 1)Tl;j
For analytical convenience it is now assumed that per-capita transfers are a fraction of
per-capita consumption spending
Tj;l = j;lPjCj
with j;j = 0 for all j such that the budget constraint (42) can be rewritten as 
1 +
JX
l=1
j;l
!
PjCj =WjLj + j (43)
If
JP
k=1
j;l > 0, then j is a creditor country and runs a trade surplus.
The optimal labor supply condition (25) becomes

1  Lj =
Wj
1 +
JP
l=1
j;l

PjCj
(44)
and consumption follows as
Cj = Lj!
1
 1
j
 
1 +
JX
l=1
j;l
! 1
(45)
The markups (15)-(17), per-capita output (28), real wages (31) and real prots (33) are
not a¤ected. If j runs a surplus, this reduces per-capita consumption Cj . Intuitively, due
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to logarithmic utility in (1), output Lj is constant. If j transfers some of its produced
wealth to other countries, then its consumption must fall.
Now use the notation
JX
l=1
j;l =
CAj
CONSj
where CAj denotes the nominal current account of country j and CONSj denotes the
nominal consumption of country j. The equations corresponding to (22) and (23) are
 j;k = 1 
(EXPk;j)

 1

POPk
POPj
 1
 1

1 +
CAj
CONSj

(EXPj;k) (GDPk   EXPk)
1
 1 (sj)
1
 1

1 + CAkCONSk

k;j = 1 
(EXPj;k)

 1

POPj
POPk
 1
 1

1 + CAkCONSk

(EXPk;j) (GDPj   EXPj)
1
 1 (sk)
1
 1

1 +
CAj
CONSj

For example, suppose that initially both j and k have a balanced current account (CAj =
CAk = 0). If all else being equal j now becomes a surplus country (CAj > 0), then
 j;k drops whereas k;j increases. Intuitively, country j would not run a surplus unless
trade costs shifted into directions favorable for exports from j to k and disadvantageous
for imports from k to j. But gravity equation (20) that make use of trade cost symmetry
and from which empirical trade costs are computed is not a¤ected by introducing trade
imbalances.
In order to understand the models implications for bilateral trade imbalances, it is
useful to look at the ratio Vj;k of nominal exports between j and k
Vj;k  pjEXPj;k
pkEXPk;j
=
1 +
CAj
CONSj
1 + CAkCONSk
What matters for the ratio Vj;k is whether the two countries each run a net total decit
or a net total surplus. For example, even if j transfers money to k (Tj;k > 0, which might
seem like a surplus for j), it can still be the case that k is a net exporter to j (Vj;k < 1).
A country therefore runs either a surplus or a decit against all its trading partners,
regardless of the monetary ows from individual trading partners.
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B Data Appendix
B.1 Exports and GDP
The export data, denominated in U.S. dollars, are taken from the IMF Direction of
Trade Statistics (DOTS), provided by the Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS)
at http://www.esds.ac.uk/. The GDP data come from the IMF International Finan-
cial Statistics (IFS), also provided by the ESDS. The following IFS data lines are used:
line 99B..ZF (GDP in national currency), line 99BI.ZF (GDP deator) and line ..RF.ZF
(period average exchange rate in national currency per U.S. dollar). Both the GDP and
the export data are deated with the respective GDP deators. Export deators are only
available for a small number of countries and were therefore not used.
B.2 Explanatory Variables
The distance data represent great-circle distances between capital cities. They have been
collected from the website http://www.indo.com/distance/.
The following variables are taken from Andrew Roses (2000) data set, available at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/: the border dummy, the colonial dummy,
the language dummy, the free trade agreement dummy, the exchange rate volatility, the
surface area variable, the landlocked variable and the island variable. The landlocked
and island variables take on the value 1 if one of the trading partners is landlocked or an
island and the value 2 if both partners are landlocked or islands. The surface area variable
represents the logarithm of the product of surface areas for each country pair.
The cut-o¤ point for the colonial dummy is 1900. According to that criterion, the
U.S. and Canada are not regarded as British colonies but Australia and Ireland had to be
converted into British colonies. India and New Zealand were counted as British colonies
already. The language dummy needed correction in that English had to be replaced by
Italian as an o¢ cial Swiss language. The coding of the trade agreement dummy had to be
switched for the Netherlands and New Zealand. Australia was counted as an island.
Roses data are updated for the year 2000. IMF IFS exchange rate data are used
to compute the exchange rate volatility in the same way as in the original data set.
Information about recent free trade agreements is available on the WTO website at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm under Facts and g-
ures. Amongst others the updated free trade agreement variable includes the Canada-
Chile free trade agreement, the Mercosur agreement and NAFTA.
The remaining four variables (the tari¤ variable, the government share of consumption,
the ination variable and the extent of capital controls) are taken from the Economic
Freedom of the World 2004 Annual Report, published by the Fraser Institute and made
available at http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/economicfreedom/. For each variable the
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report gives a rating on a scale from 0 to 10. A rating of 10 is given for the lowest
tari¤ rates, the lowest government share of consumption, the lowest ination rate and the
lowest extent of capital controls. Joint observations for countries j and k are constructed
by multiplying the single-country ratings and then taking natural logarithms. Using the
logarithms of the products instead of the logarithms of the sums leads to symmetric and
constant interaction e¤ects. In order to make the coe¢ cients in the regressions more
intuitive, the logarithms are multiplied by ( 1) such that higher values indicate higher
tari¤ rates, higher government shares of consumption, higher ination rates and greater
extents of capital controls.
The tari¤ variable is constructed using the data from component 4A of the Economic
Freedom Report, Taxes on international trade.It combines the tari¤ revenue as a per-
centage of exports and imports, the mean tari¤ rate and the standard deviation of tari¤
rates. The government share of consumption is constructed using the data from component
1A, General government consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption.
The ination variable is constructed using the data from component 3C, Recent ination
rate.The variable indicating the extent of capital controls is constructed using the data
from component 4E, International capital market controls. It combines the access of
citizens to foreign capital markets as well as foreign access to domestic capital markets
and restrictions of the freedom of citizens to engage in capital market exchange with for-
eigners. For the 2000 regression in Table 5 only, the tari¤, ination and capital control
variables are multiplied by 100.
Table A1 reports simple correlations between the variables used in the regressions.
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